Abstract. In this paper, I examine the limit of incompleteness w.r.t. interpretation. I first define the notion "Gödel's first incompleteness theorem (G1 for short) holds for theory T ". This paper is motivated by the following question: whether there is a weaker theory T than Robinson's R w.r.t. interpretation such that G1 holds for T ? In this paper, I show that there are many such theories via two different methods. The first proof is based on JeŘábek's work using some model theory and I show that from each recursively inseparable pair we can construct a weaker theory than R w.r.t. interpretation such that G1 holds for it. The second proof is based on Shoenfield's work using some recursion theory and I show that for any Turing degree 0 < d < 0 ′ , there is a weaker theory than R w.r.t. interpretation with Turing degree d such that G1 holds for it. As two corollaries, I answer a question from Albert Visser and show that there is no weakest theory below R w.r.t. Turing degrees such that G1 holds for it.
Introduction
Gödel's incompleteness theorem is one of the most remarkable result in the foundation of mathematics and has had great influence in logic, philosophy, mathematics, physics and computer science, as discussed in [18] , [23] . Gödel proved his incompleteness theorems in [8] for a certain formal system P related to Russell-Whitehead's Principia Mathematica and based on the simple theory of types over the natural number series and the Dedekind-Peano axioms (see [1] , p.3). The following theorem is a modern reformulation of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. I would like to thank Prof Albert Visser for inspiring discussions of the topic in this paper, insightful comments on the original version of the paper for improvement and for introducing some useful papers to me. I would also like to thank Prof Emil Jeřábek for his patient explanations of his work to me.
The notion of interpretation provides us a method to compare different theories in different languages (for the definition of interpretation, see Section 2) . Given theories S and T , we use S ✂ T to denote that S is interpretable in T (or T interprets S); S ✁ T denotes that S is interpretable in T but T is not interpretable in S; S and T are mutually interpretable if S ✂ T and T ✂ S. Whenever we say that S is weaker than T w.r.t. interpretation, this means that S ✁ T .
G1 can be generalized via interpretability: there exists a weak recursively axiomatizable consistent subtheory T of PA such that each recursively axiomatizable theory S in which T is interpretable is incomplete (see [28] ). To generalize this fact, in the following, I propose a new notion "G1 holds for T ". Definition 1.3. Let T be a recursively axiomatizable consistent theory. G1 holds for T iff for any recursively axiomatizable consistent theory S, if T is interpretable in S, then S is incomplete.
The goal of this work is to find the limit of incompleteness w.r.t. interpretation. Toward Question 1.2, in this project, I want to examine the following question: Question 1.4. Can we find a weakest theory S w.r.t. interpretation such that G1 holds for it?
It is well known that G1 holds for Robinson's arithmetic Q (see [28] ). From [28] , G1 also holds for Robinson's theory R (for the definitions of Q and R, see Section 2). In Section 2, I review some essentially undecidable sub-theories which are mutually interpretable with Q, and some essentially undecidable sub-theories of Q which are mutually interpretable with R.
As the first step toward Question 1.4, a natural question is whether there is a weaker theory than Robinson's R w.r.t. interpretation for which G1 holds. Question 1.5. Can we find a theory S such that G1 holds for S and S ✁ R.
In this paper, I positively answer Question 1.5 showing that there are many examples of such a theory S via two different methods. Firstly, I show that from each recursively inseparable pair we can construct a theory S such that G1 holds for S and S ✁ R based on JeŘábek's work using some model theory. Secondly, I show that for any Turing degree 0 < d < 0 ′ , there is a theory S such that G1 holds for S, S ✁ R and S has Turing degree d based on Shoenfield's work using some recursion theory. The main results of this paper are Theorem 3.23 and Theorem 3.28.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 1, I introduce my research question and the main result of this paper. In Section 2, I list some basic notions and facts we use in this paper and give a review of weaker theories than PA w.r.t. interpretation for which G1 holds in the literature. In Section 3, I positively answer Question 1.5, providing many examples of weaker theories than R w.r.t. interpretation for which G1 holds via two different methods. As two corollaries, I answer a question from Albert Visser and show that there is no weakest theory below R w.r.t. Turing degrees such that G1 holds for it. In Section 4, I conclude the paper with some interesting open questions.
Preliminaries
In this section, I review some basic notions and facts used in this paper. Our notations are standard. For books on Gödel's incompleteness theorem, we refer to [5] , [18] , [17] , [23] , [2] . For survey papers on Gödel's incompleteness theorem, we refer to [1] , [16] , [24] , [35] . For meta-mathematics of subsystems of PA, we refer to [12] .
A language consists of an arbitrary number of relation and function symbols of arbitrary finite arity.
1 A theory is a deductively closed set of sentences in a particular language. For a given theory T , we use L(T ) to denote the language of T and often equate L(T ) with the list of non-logical constants of the language. For formula φ in L(T ), let T ⊢ φ denote that φ is provable in T .
2 T is consistent if no contradiction is provable in T . φ is independent of T if T φ and T ¬φ. T is complete if for any sentence φ in L(T ), either T ⊢ φ or T ⊢ ¬φ; otherwise, T is incomplete.
3 A theory T is locally finitely satisfiable if every finitely axiomatized subtheory of T has a finite model.
In this paper we always assume the arithmetization of first order theory with a recursive set of non-logical constants. Let T be a recursively axiomatizable theory. Under this arithmetization, we could establish the one-to-one correspondence between expressions of L(T ) and natural numbers. Under this correspondence, we can translate metamathematical statements about the formal theory T into statements about natural numbers. Furthermore, fundamental metamathematical relations can be translated in this way into certain recursive relations, hence into relations representable in theory T . Consequently, one can speak about a formal system of arithmetic and about its properties as a theory in the system itself! This is the essence of Gödel's idea of arithmetization. Under arithmetization, any formula or finite sequence of formulas can be coded by a natural number (this code is called Gödel's number). In this paper, we use φ to denote the Gödel number of φ. For details of arithmetization, we refer to [18] .
Given a set of sentences Σ, we say Σ is recursive if the set of Gödel numbers of sentences in Σ is recursive. A theory T is decidable if the set of sentences provable in T is recursive; otherwise it is undecidable. T is recursively axiomatizable if it has a recursive set of axioms 4 and it is finitely axiomatizable if the set of axioms is finite. T is recursively enumerable (r.e.) if it has a recursively enumerable set of axioms. T is essentially undecidable iff any recursively axiomatizable consistent extension of T in the same language is undecidable. T is essentially incomplete iff any recursively axiomatizable consistent extension of T in the same language is incomplete. The theory of completeness/incompleteness is closely related to the theory of decidability/undecidability. T is minimal essentially undecidable iff T is essentially undecidable and if deleting any axiom of T , the remaining theory is no longer essentially undecidable.
A n-ary relation R(
For the definitions of Σ n and ∆ n formulas, we refer to [18] . A bounded formula (or Σ 0 formula) is a formula which is built from atomic formulas using only propositional connectives and bounded quantifiers.
Let T be a theory in the language L(T ), and S a theory in the language L(S). In its most simple form, a translation I of language L(T ) into language L(S) is specified by: (1) an L(S)-formula δ I (x) denoting the domain of I; (2) for each relation symbol R of L(T ), an L(S)-formula R I of the same arity; (3) 
is an interpretation of T in S if S proves the following facts: (1) for each function symbol F of L(T ) of arity k, the formula expressing that F I is total on δ I :
2) the I-translations of all axioms of T . The simplified picture of translations and interpretations above actually describes only one-dimensional, parameter-free, and one-piece translations. For the precise definitions of a multi-dimensional interpretation, an interpretation with parameters and a piece-wise interpretation, we refer to [29] , [33] , [34] for the details.
A theory T is interpretable in a theory S if there exists an interpretation of T in S. If T is interpretable in S, then all sentences provable (refutable) in T are mapped, by the interpretation function, to sentences provable (refutable) in S. Interpretability can be accepted as a measure of strength of different theories. 6 We say that a theory U weakly interprets a theory V (or V is weakly interpretable in U) if V is interpretable in some consistent extension of U in the same language.
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I is a faithful interpretation of T in S iff I is an interpretation of T in S such that for any sentence φ in L(T ), T ⊢ φ iff S ⊢ φ I . A general method for establishing the undecidability of theories is developed in [28] . The following theorem provides us two methods to prove the essentially undecidability of a theory via interpretation and representability. In Section 3, I will show that G1 holds for T iff T is essentially undecidable. In the following, I review some weaker theories than PA w.r.t. interpretation which are essentially undecidable in the literature.
Robinson Arithmetic Q was introduced in [28] by Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson as a base axiomatic theory for investigating incompleteness and undecidability. Definition 2.2. Robinson Arithmetic Q is defined in the language {0, S, +, ·} with the following axioms: (1) ∀x∀y(Sx = Sy → x = y); (2) ∀x(Sx = 0); (3) ∀x(x = 0 → ∃yx = Sy); (4) ∀x∀y(x + 0 = x); (5) ∀x∀y(x + Sy = S(x + y)); (6) ∀x(x · 0 = 0); (7) ∀x∀y(x · Sy = x · y + x).
PA consists of axioms (1)- (2), (4)- (7) in Definition 2.2 and the following axiom scheme of induction:
where φ is a formula with at least one free variable x.
Robinson Arithmetic Q is very weak and inadequate to formalize arithmetic: for instance, Q does not even prove that addition is associative. Robinson shows that any consistent theory that interprets Q is undecidable and hence Q is essentially undecidable. The fact that Q is essentially undecidable is very useful and can be used to prove the essentially undecidability of other theories via Theorem 2.1. Since Q is finitely axiomatized, it follows that any theory that weakly interprets Q is undecidable. In fact, Q is minimal essentially undecidable in the sense that if deleting any axiom of Q, then the remaining theory is not essentially undecidable and has a complete decidable extension (see [28, Theorem 11, p.62] ). Q represents a rich degree of interpretability since a lot of stronger theories are interpretable in it as I will show in the following passages.
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Now I first discuss some prominent fragments of PA extending Q in the literature. IΣ n is Q plus induction for Σ n formulas and BΣ n+1 is IΣ 0 plus collection for Σ n+1 formulas. It is well known that the following theories form a strictly increasing hierarchy:
Define ω 1 (x) = x |x| and ω n+1 (x) = 2 ωn(|x|) where |x| is the length of the binary expression of x. Let Ω n denote the statement ∀x∃y(ω n (x) = y) which says that ω n (x) is total. There is a bounded formula Exp(x, y, z) such that IΣ 0 proves that (see [ 
. However, IΣ 0 cannot prove the totality of Exp(x, y, z). Let exp denote the statement postulating the totality of the exponential function ∀x∀y∃z Exp(x, y, z).
As a corollary, we have:
Ω n , · · · are all mutually interpretable; (2) IΣ 0 + exp and BΣ 1 + exp are mutually interpretable; (3) For n ≥ 1, IΣ n and BΣ n+1 are mutually interpretable;
Now we discuss some variants of Q in the literature. Andrzej Grzegorczyk considered a theory Q − in which addition and multiplication do satisfy natural reformulations of axioms of Q but are possibly nontotal functions. More exactly, the language of Q − is {0, S, A, M} where 8 Nelson embarks on a program in [19] of investigating how much mathematics can be interpreted in Robinson's Arithmetic Q: what can be interpreted in Q but also what cannot be interpreted in Q.
9 See [6, Theorem 6, p.313]. Solovay proved that IΣ 0 + ¬exp is interpretable in Q (see [6, Theorem 7, p 
.314]).
A and M are ternary relations, and the axioms of Q − are the axioms Q1-Q3 of Q plus the following six axioms about A and M:
A. Grzegorczyk asked whether Q − was essentially undecidable. Petr Hájek considered a somewhat stronger theory with axioms
instead of G5 and G7. He showed that this stronger variant of Q − is essentially undecidable.Švejdar provided a positive answer to Grzegorczyk's original question in [25] and proved that Q is interpretable in Q − (and hence Q − is essentially undecidable).
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Let Q + be the extension of Q with the following extra axioms:
It is interesting to compare Q with its bigger brother PA − . The theory PA − is the theory of commutative, discretely ordered semirings with a minimal element plus the subtraction axiom. PA − has the following axioms with
A. Grzegorczyk considered another weak theory, the theory of concatenation TC in [9] . It has the language {⌢, α, β} with a binary function symbol and two constants, and the following axioms:
; TC3: ∀x∀y(α = x ⌢ y); TC4: ∀x∀y(β = x ⌢ y); TC5: α = β. 10 The interpretation of Q in Q − in [25] is constructed using the Solovay method of shortening of cuts.
11 The language L(Q + ) extends L(Q) and includes the binary relation symbol ≤.
Andrzej Grzegorczyk proved (mere) undecidability of the theory TC in [9] . Grzegorczyk and Zdanowski proved that TC is essential undecidable in [10] . However, [10] leaves an interesting unanswered problem: are TC and Q mutually interpretable?Švejdar shows in [27] that Q − is interpretable in TC and hence Q is interpretable in TC since Q is interpretable in Q − . M. Ganea gives a different proof in [7] of the interpretability of Q in TC, but he also uses the detour via Q − . Visser gives a proof of the interpretability of Q in TC not using Q − in [32] . S 1 2 is a finitely axiomatizable theory introduced by Buss in [3] . From [6] , IΣ 0 is interpretable in S and Q are all mutually interpretable and essentially undecidable.
In the following, I introduce Robinson's theory R and some variants of it. Theory R is introduced by Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson in [28] .
Definition 2.4. Let R be the system consisting of schemes Ax1-Ax5 with L(R) = {0, S, +, ·, ≤} where m, n ∈ N and n = S n (0).
The axiom schemes of R contain all key properties of arithmetic for the proof of G1. R is not finitely axiomatizable. Note that R ✁ Q since Q is not interpretable in R: if Q were interpretable in R, then it would also be interpretable in some finite fragment of R; however R is locally finitely satisfiable and any model of Q is infinite. Visser proved in [34] the following special property of R which provides a unique characterization of R. Theorem 2.5. (Visser, [34, Theorem 6]) For any r.e. theory T , T is locally finitely satisfiable iff T is interpretable in R.
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Since relational Σ 2 sentences have the finite model property, by Theorem 2.5, any consistent theory axiomatized by a recursive set of Σ 2 sentences in a finite relational language is interpretable in R. Since all recursive functions are representable in R (see [28, theorem 6] , p.56), as a corollary of (2) in Theorem 2.1, R is essentially undecidable. Cobham shows that R has a stronger property than essential undecidability. Theorem 2.6. (Cobham, [30] ) Any r.e. theory that weakly interprets R is undecidable. 13 12 In fact, if T is locally finitely satisfiable, then T is interpretable in R via a one-piece one-dimensional parameter-free interpretation. 13 Vaught gave a proof of Cobham's theorem 2.6 via existential interpretation in [30] .
Let R 0 be the system consisting of schemes Ax1, Ax2, Ax3 and Ax4. R 0 is no longer essentially undecidable.
14 In fact, whether R 0 is essentially undecidable depends on the language of R. If L(R) = {0, S, +, ·, ≤ } with ≤ defined in terms of +, then R 0 is essentially undecidable.
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Let R 1 be the system consisting of schemes Ax1, Ax2, Ax3 and Ax4 ′ where Ax4
′ is defined as follows:
R 1 is essentially undecidable since R is interpretable in R 1 (see [15] , p. 62). However R 1 is not minimal essentially undecidable. Let R 2 be the system consisting of schemes Ax2, Ax3 and Ax4 ′ . From [15] , R is interpretable in R 2 and hence R 2 is essentially undecidable.
16
R 2 is minimal essentially undecidable in the sense that if we delete any axiom scheme of R 2 , then the remaining system is not essentially undecidable.
17 By essentially the same argument as in [29] , we can show that any r.e. theory that weakly interprets R 2 is undecidable. In a summary, R, R 0 , R 1 and R 2 are mutually interpretable and essentially undecidable.
Up to now, we do not have any example of essentially undecidable theory which is weaker than R w.r.t. interpretation. Recently, Jeřábek shows in [13] that there exists a theory T in which all partially recursive functions are representable, yet T does not interpret R. In the following, I give an overview of Jeřábek's work in [13] . The main motivation question of [13] is: if a theory represents all partial recursive functions, does it interpret Robinson's theory R? [13] positively answers this question and finds a theory Rep PRF which represents all partial recursive functions, but does not interpret R. The proof borrows tools from model theory: investigating model-theoretic properties of the model completion of the empty theory in a language with function symbols. Now I introduce Jeřábek's theory Rep PRF . Let PRF denote the sets of all partial recursive functions. The language L(Rep PRF ) consists of constant symbolsn for each n ∈ N and function symbols f of appropriate arity for each partial recursive function f . The theory Rep PRF is axiomatized by:
(1) n = m for n = m ∈ N;
14 R 0 has a decidable complete extension given by the theory of reals with ≤ as the empty relation on reals. 15 Cobham first observed that R with L(R) = {0, S, +, ·} is interpretable in R 0 and hence R 0 is essentially undecidable (see [30] and [15] ). 16 Another way to show that R 2 is essentially undecidable is to prove that all recursive functions are representable in R 2 .
17 If we delete Ax2, then the theory of natural numbers with x · y defined as x + y is a complete decidable extension; if we delete Ax3, then the theory of models with only one element is a complete decidable extension; if we delete Ax4 ′ , then the theory of reals is a complete decidable extension.
Rep PRF is essentially undecidable since all recursive functions are representable in it. Since Rep PRF is locally finitely satisfiable, by Theorem 2.5, Rep PRF ✂ R. [13] proves that R is not interpretable in Rep PRF . So essentially [13] provides an example of essentially undecidable theory which is weaker than R w.r.t. interpretation. However, [13] is not written in the spirit of answering Question 1.5 and the potential of the method in [13] is not jet fully explored. In the following section, I will give more examples of theory S such that G1 holds for S and S ✁ R.
Finding the limit of incompleteness
In this section, I answer Question 1.5 positively and show that there are many weaker theories than R w.r.t. interpretation for which G1 holds via two different methods. Firstly, I show that we can find many such theories based on JeŘábek's work using some model theory; and secondly I show this based on Shoenfield's work using some recursion theory. First of all, I give some equivalent characterizations of the notion "G1 holds for T ". (2) ⇔ (3): It is well known that every consistent recursively axiomatizable complete theory is decidable; and every incomplete decidable theory has a consistent, decidable complete extension in the same language (see Corollary 3.1.8 and Theorem 3.1.9 in [18] , p.214-215). From these two facts, T is essentially undecidable iff T is essentially incomplete.
(2) ⇒ (1): Follows from Theorem 2.1 and (2) ⇔ (3).
As a corollary of Section 2, we have:
(1) G1 holds for the following theories and they are mutually interpretable with Q:
2) G1 holds for the following theories and they are mutually interpretable with R: R 0 , R 1 and R 2 . (3) G1 holds for Rep PRF and Rep PRF ✁ R.
In the following, I first give more examples of theory S such that G1 holds for S and S ✁ R based on JeŘábek's work in [13] . Definition 3.2. S, T is a recursively inseparable pair if S and T are disjoint r.e. sets, and there is no recursive set X ⊆ N such that S ⊆ X and X ∩ T = ∅. Definition 3.3. Let A, B be a recursively inseparable pair. Let L be the finite language {0, S, P} with n = S n (0). Consider the following theory U A,B :
In the following, let A, B be an arbitrary recursively inseparable pair.
Lemma 3.4. G1 holds for U A,B .
Proof. By Proposition 3.1, it suffices to show that U A,B is essentially incomplete. let S be a recursively axiomatizable consistent extension of U A,B . Let X = {n : S ⊢ P(n)} and Y = {n : S ⊢ ¬P(n)}. Then A ⊆ X and B ⊆ Y . Since S is recursively axiomatizable and consistent, X and Y are disjoint recursive enumerable sets. Since A, B is recursively inseparable, X ∪ Y = N. Take n / ∈ X ∪ Y . Then S P(n) and S ¬P(n). Hence S is incomplete. 
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Lemma 3.6. U A,B is interpretable in R.
Proof. By Fact 3.5, there exists a formula φ(x) with one free variable such that R ⊢ φ(n) iff n ∈ A and R ⊢ ¬φ(n) iff n ∈ B.
19 Thus U A,B is interpretable in R via interpreting P(x) as φ(x).
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Now I want to show that U A,B does not interpret R using the main theorem 5.1 in [13] . Since [13] is not jet published, to make the paper self-contained, I will prove Theorem 3.18 which is a simplified version of theorem 5.1 in [13] . From Theorem 3.18, we can show that U A,B does not interpret R. We could view the following presentations as some reconstructions of JeŘábek's work in [13] in the spirit of answering my question of finding the limit of incompleteness w.r.t. interpretation.
Our strategy to prove that U A,B does not interpret R is to consistently extend the interpreting theory to a theory with quantifier elimination, using the fact that the empty theory in an arbitrary language 18 φ(x) numerates A in T if for any n, n ∈ A iff T ⊢ φ(n). 19 The proof of Fact 3.5 in [17, Theorem 2, p.43] uses the fixed point theorem for T . Since the fixed point theorem holds for R, Fact 3.5 also applies to R. 20 Another way to prove Lemma 3.6 is: since U A,B is locally finitely satisfiable,
L has a model completion which we denote EC L , the theory of existentially closed L-structures. 21 The proof of Theorem 3.18 essentially uses some properties of EC L . The model completion of the empty L-theory is well known for finite relational languages L. However, it is much less known that the model completion of the empty L-theory does exist for arbitrary languages L as we need here, which was proved by Winkler in [36] as a corollary of more general results on model companions of Skolem expansions of model-complete theories (see [13] , p.15). In the following, I give a self-contained argument that the model completion of the empty L-theory exists which will help us determine syntactically what open formulas are consistent with the theory. To prove Theorem 3.16, I first review some definitions and facts we need from model theory. 
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Fact 3.8. Let M be an L-structure. , 1} for every k-ary relation R ∈ L, and every t 0 , ..., t k−1 ∈ Θ. Let ∼ be an equivalence relation on Θ such that:
If F ∈ L is k-ary, and t F (t) ∈ Θ and s F (s) ∈ Θ satisfy t i ∼ s i for each i < k, then t ∼ s. Then the elementary existential formula ∃yθ Θ,∼,τ (x, y) is defined by 
By induction on t ∈ ∆, we have for any t ∈ ∆,
25 Let Θ be the set of all subterms of θ(x, y), and ∆ the set of all atomic subformulas of θ(x, y). We can write θ(x, y) in full disjunctive normal form from atomic formulas in ∆, and switch disjunctions with existential quantifiers. Each disjunct has the form (3.1), except for the conditions on ∼ and τ . However, it is easy to see that if ∼ is not an equivalence relation, or if condition (i) or (ii) in Definition 3.11 is violated, then θ Θ,∼,τ (x, y) is contradictory. 
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(1) There exists an extension N ⊇ M such that N |= ∃yθ Θ,∼,τ (ū, y).
The following theorem is a reformulation of Theorem 3.7 in [13] . (ii): Follows from (i) by Theorem 3.9.
This follows from the fact that EC L is a conservative extension of EC L and an expansion of an existentially closed model by constants is still existentially closed. 28 (1)⇒ (2) follows from the definitions and property (3.2). (2)⇒ (1): Let N be the disjoint union of M and (Θ \ ∆)/ ∼, and identify t/ ∼ with t * (ū) for t ∈ ∆.
By Definition 3.11 and the properties of ∼ and Θ, it is easy to check that the definition is independent of the choice of representatives. Since M |= θ * Θ,∼,τ (u), the definition agrees with M if t 0 , · · · , t k−1 ∈ ∆. We can thus extend the definition with M , and then arbitrarily to the remaining tuples from N . This definition ensures N |= θ Θ,∼,τ (x/ ∼, y/ ∼), where x i / ∼= u i .
(iii): By Theorem 3.9, it suffices to show that any existentially closed L-structure is a model of EC L , which follows from (2) ⇒ (1) in Lemma 3.15. By (1) Proof. Let φ be a (L∪{R})-sentence. It suffices to show that
elementary substructure of M I and hence M |= φ.
To show that U A,B does not interpret R, I use the following important theorem due to JeŘábek. The proof of Theorem 5.1 in [13] is not very easy to read. To make the paper self-contained, here I give a more detailed and readable reconstruction of JeŘábek's proof. Theorem 3.18. (JeŘábek, [13] ) For any language L and formula φ(z, x, y), there is a constant n with the following property. Let M |= EC L and u ∈ M be such that M |= ∃x 0 , · · · , ∃x n−1 i<j<n φ(u, x i , x j ). Then for every m ∈ ω and an asymmetric relation R on {0, · · · , m−1}, M |= ∃x 0 , · · · , ∃x m−1 i,j ∈R φ(u, x i , x j ).
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Proof. By Lemma 3.17 and Theorem 3.16, we may assume L contains no relations and φ is open. Let p be the number of subterms of φ, and k = 2 256·p 2 . Using Ramsey's theorem, let n be sufficiently large so that n → (7) 4 → k, there exists a set X ⊆ n with size 7 such that f is constant on [X] 4 . Fix M |= EC L , u ∈ M and {a i : i < n} ⊆ M such that M |= φ(u, a i , a j ) for i < j < n. In order to simplify the notation, we may assume u is given by a constant of L, and write just φ(x, y). Let Σ be the set of all subterms t(x, y) of φ, and for every i 0 < i 1 < i 2 < i 3 < n, define
f is a colouring of [n] 4 by at most k colours. Thus, we can find a 7-element homogeneous set H ⊆ n for f . WLOG, we may assume H = {0, · · · , 6}.
By homogeneity, note that s M (a i , a j ) = t M (a 0 , a 6 ) = s M (a p , a q ) for every 0 < i < j < 6, 0 < p < q < 6 and hence by homogeneity again s M (a i , a j ) = s M (a p , a q ) for all i < j, p < q. Fix a set of variables {y α : α < m}, and define Θ = {t(y α , y β ) : α, β ∈ R, t(x, y) ∈ Σ}. If t ∈ Θ, let D(t) denote the set of α < m such that y α occurs in t. Note that |D(t)| ≤ 2. A realization of t is an injective function h : D(t) → H such that if α, β ∈ D(t) and α, β ∈ R, then h(α) < h(β).
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If h is a realization of t(y α , y β ), define h(t) ∈ M as t M (a h(α) , a h(β) ). A joint realization of a set of terms {t 0 , · · · , t l−1 } ⊆ Θ is an injective mapping h :
) is a realization of t i for any i < l. Note that any pair {t, s} ⊆ Θ has a joint realization since R is asymmetric. If t, s ∈ Θ, and h is a joint realization of t and s, we define the relation ∼ on Θ as Let ∆ ⊆ Θ and {t * : t ∈ ∆} be as in Definition 3.13 (for emptyx). By induction on the definition of t ∈ ∆, we see that the value of the closed term t * in M coincides with h(t) for any realization h of t. From this fact and the definition of ∼, we have M |= θ Proof. (1): Suppose this does not hold and apply Theorem 3.18 to the formula which interprets i<j<n x i = x j ∧ ∀y(y ∈ z ↔ i<n y = x i ) and R a chain longer than n to get a contradiction.
(2): Note that T is interpretable in R. Since T is not weakly interpretable in EC L for any language L, R is not weakly interpretable in EC L for any language L. Proof. From (2) and (3) in Proposition 3.22, R is not interpretable in U A,B . From Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.6, we have G1 holds for U A,B and U A,B ✁ R. Theorem 3.24. (JeŘábek, [13] ) For Σ 2 -axiomatized theory T , T is interpretable in a consistent existential theory iff T is weakly interpretable in EC L for some language L.
As a corollary of Theorem 3.24 and (2) in Proposition 3.22, any consistent existential theory does not interpret R. So, from this and Theorem 2.5, if a consistent existential theory S is essentially undecidable and locally finitely satisfiable, then G1 holds for S and S ✁ R (i.e. S is a solution for Question 1.5).
In the following, I will give more examples for Question 1. Proof. By Theorem 3.25, pick a recursively inseparable pair B, C such that A, B and C have the same Turing degree. Now we define the theory T with L(T ) = {R} where R is a binary relation symbol. Theory T contains axioms asserting that R is an equivalence relation. Let Φ n be the statement that there is an equivalence class of R consisting of n elements. Then as further axioms we adopt Φ n for all n ∈ B and ¬Φ n for all n ∈ C. Finally, for each n we adopt an axiom asserting there is at most one equivalence class having n elements. Clearly T is consistent and axiomatizable. Using models, we see Φ n is provable iff n ∈ B, and ¬Φ n is provable iff n ∈ C. Hence B and C are recursive in T . Using Lemma 2 of [14] , since no two equivalence classes have the same number of elements, every sentence φ of T is equivalent to a truth function of the Φ n , and that this truth function may be calculated from φ. It follows that T is recursive in B and C. Hence T has the same Turing degree as A.
Finally, we show that T is essentially undecidable. Suppose T has a consistent decidable extension S. Let D be the set of n such that Φ n is provable in S. Then D is recursive, B ⊆ D, and C ∩ D = ∅ which contradicts the fact that B, C is a recursively inseparable pair.
The following theorem due to Visser is essentially used in the proof of Theorem 3.28.
Theorem 3.27. (Visser, [31] ) If U is a r.e. theory which weakly interprets Q, then if V is interpretable in U, then V is faithfully interpretable in U.
In the following, I will prove Theorem 3.28 which improves Shoenfield's Theorem 3.26. I first give an overview of the idea of the proof. Let d be a Turing degree with 0 < d < 0 ′ .
Step One: By Shoenfield's theorem, there is a consistent axiomatizable essentially undecidable theory S such that S has Turing degree d.
Step Two: Consider the product theory S ⊗R of S and R which has the following axioms: P → X if X is a S-axiom; ¬P → Y if Y is a R-axiom where P is a 0-ary relation symbol. We show that S ⊗ R is essentially undecidable and S ⊗ R ✂ R.
Step Three: If R is faithfully interpretable in r.e. theory S, then S has Turing degree 0 ′ .
Step Four: We show that R is not interpretable in S ⊗ R. So G1 holds for S ⊗ R, S ⊗ R ✁ R and S ⊗ R has Turing degree d. Theorem 3.28. For any Turing degree 0 < d < 0 ′ , there is a theory U such that G1 holds for U, U ✁ R and U has Turing degree d.
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Proof. Let d be a Turing degree with 0 < d < 0 ′ . By Shoenfield's theorem, pick an essentially undecidable theory S such that S has Turing degree d. Take the product theory S ⊗ R defined as above. Firstly, I show that G1 holds for S ⊗ R. Lemma 3.29. S ⊗ R is essentially undecidable.. Proof. Suppose U is a consistent decidable extension of S ⊗ R. Define X = { φ , ψ : U ⊢ P → φ or U ⊢ ¬P → ψ}. Since U is decidable, X is recursive. Note that S ⊆ (X) 0 and R ⊆ (X) 1 . I claim that at least one of (X) 0 and (X) 1 is consistent. If both (X) 0 and (X) 1 are inconsistent, then U ⊢ (P →⊥) and U ⊢ (¬P →⊥). So U ⊢⊥ which contradicts that U is consistent. WLOG, we assume that (X) 0 is consistent. Then (X) 0 is consistent decidable extension of S which contradicts that S is essentially undecidable.
It is easy to show that S ⊗ R is interpretable in R (i.e. S ⊗ R ✂ R): take the identity interpretation on the R side and interpret P as ⊥.
Lemma 3.30. S ⊗ R does not interpret R. 32 I would like to thank Prof Albert Visser for introducing Shoenfield's paper to me and the idea of using Shoenfield's paper to give new examples of theories for Question 1.5 is due to him.
Proof. Suppose R is interpretable in S ⊗ R. Since R weakly interprets Q, S ⊗ R weakly interprets Q. By Theorem 3.27, since S ⊗ R weakly interprets Q and R is interpretable in S ⊗ R, we have R is faithfully interpretable in S ⊗ R. Lemma 3.31. If R is faithfully interpretable in the r.e. theory S, then S has Turing degree 0 ′ .
Proof. Let I be the faithful interpretation of R in S. It suffices to show that any r.e. set A is Turing reducible to S. By the Σ 1 -completeness of R, any r.e. set is representable in R. Then there is a formula φ(x) such that for any n ∈ N, if n ∈ A, then R ⊢ φ(n); if n / ∈ A, then R ⊢ ¬φ(n). Since R ⊢ φ(n) iff S ⊢ φ I (n) and R is consistent, we have n ∈ A iff S ⊢ φ I (n). So A is Turing reducible to S.
Since R is faithfully interpretable in S ⊗ R, by Lemma 3.31, S ⊗ R has Turing degree 0 ′ . One the other hand, R has Turing degree 0 ′ by Lemma 3.31 and hence S ⊗ R has Turing degree d < 0
′ which leads to a contradiction.
So S ⊗ R ✁ R, G1 holds for S ⊗ R and S ⊗ R has Turing degree d.
As a corollary of Theorem 3.23, we can answer a question from Albert Visser: would S with S ✂ R such that G1 holds for S shares the universality property of R that every locally finitely satisfiable theory is interpretable in it. The answer for this question is negative. We have shown that for any recursively inseparable pair A, B , there is a theory U A,B such that G1 holds for U A,B and U A,B ✁ R. R is locally finitely satisfiable, but R is not interpretable in U A,B .
33 Hence, for any recursively inseparable pair A, B , the theory U A,B is a counterexample for Visser's Question. Moreover, from Theorem 3.28, for any Turing degree 0 < d < 0 ′ , there is a theory U ✂ R with Turing degree d such that G1 holds for U, but the locally finitely satisfiable theory R is not interpretable in U (i.e. theory U is a counterexample for Visser's Question). This shows the speciality of R: Theorem 2.5 provides a unique characterization of R.
Define D = {S : S✁R and G1 holds for S}. Let R be the structure of the r. e. degrees with the ordering ≤ T induced by Turing reducibility with least element 0 and greatest element 0 ′ .
Theorem 3.32.
(1) (Sacks, Embedding theorem, [20] ) Every countable partial ordering can be embedded into R. 33 Take another example: the locally finitely satisfiable theory T as in Definition 3.21 is not interpretable in U A,B since if T is interpretable in U A,B , then T is weakly interpretable in EC L for some language L which contradicts (1) in Corollary 3.22.
(2) (Sacks Density Theorem, [21] ) For every pair of nonrecursive r.e. degrees a < T b there is one c such that a < T c < T b.
From Theorem 3.32, the structure R, < T is not well founded and has incomparable elements. So, by Theorem 3.28, there is no weakest theory below R w.r.t. Turing degrees such that G1 holds for it.
Questions
A natural question is: is Q the weakest finitely axiomatized theory extending R w.r.t. interpretation such that G1 holds for Q? The following theorem tells us the answer is no. 
